JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. We consider auctions for a single indivisible object, in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller. We show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit, and we completely characterize the environments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder's willingness to pay. We provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strategies, and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is Bayesian Nash. In both set-ups, the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties.
INTRODUCTION
WE CONSIDER the situation in which an agent, the seller, possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value. But the good has value to a number of potential buyers, and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare.
In particular, the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare. In this paper, we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay.
If the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers, his optimal selling strategy would be very simple. He would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value. The optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer. (Note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price.) As a result of the exchange, the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare, and he has been able to fully extract the surplus.
In many circumstances, however, a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers' willingnesses to pay. In this case, he must find some mechanism, or auction, which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object.
The auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can, by an astute choice of auction, extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus.
In general, the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one.
In some circumstances, the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller. For instance, in auctions for petroleum drilling rights, bidders know the results of geological tests which they have IWe thank M. Whinston for several helpful discussions in the early stages of this research an David Kreps and two referees for their helpful comments. Cremer gratefully acknowledges the support from NSF Grant SES 8408942.
conducted. The results of the tests of the various bidders are correlated, and therefore they have a priori some information about each other's willingness to pay. In Cremer and McLean (1985) , we pointed out that the auctioneer could use his knowledge of the fact that the bidders have information about each other to his own advantage. In particular, we produced sufficient conditions under which the auctioneer is able to extract the full surplus.
In the present paper, we completely characterize the information structures which will guarantee that the seller can fully extract the surplus, i.e. that he can do as well as he could with full information. We do this under two alternative assumptions. First, we will study auctions which admit a dominant strategy for the bidders. Then we will turn our attention to auctions in which each bidder submits his bid in ignorance of the bids of others. In this case, the relevant equilibrium concept is Bayesian-Nash.
Not surprisingly, the requirements for full extraction of the surplus are stricter in the case of dominant strategy auctions than in the case of Bayesian auctions.
To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first examples of environments where Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions yield different payoffs when the bidders are risk neutral.
In both set-ups, the possibility of extracting the full surplus hinges on the construction of lotteries with specific properties. These lotteries consist of payments by a bidder to the seller, conditional on the announcements of other bidders. We will always consider auctions in which the buyers reveal their types to the seller. In equilibrium, these announcements will reveal the bidders' true characteristics so we can consider these lotteries to be conditional on the actual types of other bidders.
A dominant strategy auction must be, more or less, a Vickrey auction to which is appended for each bidder a payment (possibly negative) which is a function only of the bids of others.2 In a Vickrey auction, a bidder never pays more for an object than it is worth to him. Hence, whatever his type, he derives a nonnegative gain in utility, measurable in monetary units, from participation in this Vickrey auction. Ex ante, his type is known to the bidder. He will participate in the auction if and only if the expected gain in utility from the Vickrey auction is greater than or equal to the expected cost to him of the lottery, where the expectation is computed according to the probability distribution of the valuations of others, conditional on his own type. The auctioneer will extract the full surplus if these expected values are equal for all possible types of every bidder. Our first theorem characterizes those information structures for which such lotteries exist.
Hence, to extract the surplus with a dominant strategy auction, the seller must construct one lottery per buyer whose outcomes are conditional on the an-nounced valuations of the others. We emphasize that the lottery for bidder i is independent of i's type. The problem to be solved is easier in the case of Bayesian-Nash auctions. There, the seller can construct one lottery for each type of each buyer. Each lottery has an expected value of zero if the bidder is of the type by which the lottery is indexed. Otherwise, this expected value is negative and can be made as negative as we wish. This assumes, of course, that the probability distribution of the types of other bidders varies enough when one's own type changes. Then, the auction proceeds as follows: each bidder announces his type and the winner is made to pay an amount equal to his announced valuation of the object. If we stopped here, the bidder would, in general, lie.
However, we can add to this the lottery corresponding to his type. Then, the expected value of lying will become negative, and all the surplus can be extracted.
Theorem 2 characterizes information structures for which this is possible.
More precise interpretations are provided after the statement of each theorem in Section 2. An example is discussed in detail in Appendix A, and the reader may wish to examine it along with the discussion of Section 2. Our main results are presented in terms of discrete probability spaces. In Appendix B, we discuss the extension to the case of distributions with infinite support. Finally, Section 3 contains some concluding remarks.
The results answer a question originally posed by Myerson (1981) . Partial answers have been provided by Makin and Riley (1980) and ourselves (1985) . Conditions similar to those of our Theorem 2 have independently been used by Riordan and Sappington (1985) . The work of d 'Aspremont, Cremer, and Gerard-Varet (1987) suggests that these conditions might eventually play an important role in the theory of mechanism design.
THE MODEL
Throughout this paper, the bidders are indexed by the set N = {1, 2, .. ., n}.
The "characteristic" of bidder i takes values in a set Mi = { 1,..., mi.}. We will call M the set Mlx xMn and M_i the set MlxM2x ..MI,xml+ x ... Mn. To each characteristic si E Mi, there corresponds a willingness to pay wi(si) for agent i. The function wi: Ml--R + will be called an individu valuation function for agent i. In the sequel, Mi will be fixed but w' will vary Let w = (w',..., wn). The function w: M -, Rn will be called a valuation function. All bidders are assumed to be risk neutral. If agent i with characteristic
Si makes an expected payment of xi when the probability that he obtains the object is pi, his expected payoff is piw'(si) -xi. As we have shown in Cremer and McLean (1985) , the theory can be expanded to a more complex setting where, in particular, an agent's willingness to pay is a function not only of his own characteristic but also of the (for him, unobserved) characteristics of others. In this framework, Theorems 1 and 2 would still hold in a fundamentally unaltered form. Taking this into account would strengthen our statements of sufficiency (our conditions allow full extraction of the surplus in a wider class of auctions), but weaken our statements of necessity. elements of M, which are the states of nature for our problem. Agent i knows and we assume that his subjective probability distribution over Mi given s consistent with iT, i.e. that it is iT(s i1si), the same distribution that the would have were he able to observe si. Without loss of generality, we can a that the marginal probability 7T(si) = _i M_7(s_, Si) is positive. (Th some abuse of notation in using the same symbol iT for probability distributions over different spaces, but this will lead to no confusion.)
We call a pair (M, qr) an information structure. A combination (M, 'I, w) of an information structure and a valuation function defines an auction problem. Our task is to find necessary and sufficient conditions on information structures (M, iT) to ensure that, for any associated problem (M, iT, w), the seller can find an auction that will extract the full surplus.
We invoke the revelation principle and limit ourselves to auctions that induce the bidders to truthfully reveal their characteristics. Thus, an auction is con- The following lemma (whose proof is straightforward) is essential for our analysis. We can now turn to the first of our characterization theorems. This is the condition which we introduced in Cremer and McLean (1985) . It states that for any i, the matrix Fi whose rows are indexed by the elements of whose columns are indexed by the elements of M_i, and whose generic el is vI(s_ilsi), is of rank mi. The form of the condition used in Theorem 1 is intended to make comparison with Theorem 2 easier.
Interpretation of Theorem 1
This condition on the information structure is a spanning condition. It enables the auctioneer to construct a lottery of the type discussed in the introduction: for any i, its expected value to bidder i, whatever his type si, is equal to (-1) tim the expected surplus, hi(si), from participation in a Vickrey auction arbitraril chosen by the seller. A lottery for bidder i is a function Li from M_i into R, which assigns a payment by i to each (n -1)-tuple of announcements by the other bidders. Hence, we need to build a lottery Li whose expected value f type s of i, V(LilSi) = i), is equal to -hi(si). But if the condition of Theorem 1 does not hold, we have Eipi(si)Vi(Lilsi) = this lottery can be constructed only for Vickrey auctions such th is equal to zero, and therefore full extraction of the surplus is not guaranteed.
PROOF OF THE IF PART OF THEOREM 1: Let { Pi, x }i E N be a Vickrey, or second price, auction (there could be several depending on the manner in which the object is allocated when several bidders have the same willingness to pay). Let hi(si) be equal to _s EM_ T(Silsi)[p7(s)w'(si) -x*(s)]. Thus, the nonnegative number hi(si) is the true expected benefit to agent i from participating in the auction when he is of type si.
Because the matrix ri is of rank mi, there exists a family {gi(S-)}5_ cM (1) pi(s) = 1 for all s C M such that so(s) > 0, (2) w'(si) = E g(si1si)xi(si, sJ) for all si E M.
such that Es, E M_,'(s-i1si)gi(s-i) = hi(si). Let x'(s) = x*(s) + gi(s-i). It is

s-ieM_j
By incentive compatibility, there must exist a family { hi (s -(3) T(s-ilsi)xi(s-i, si) = 7(s-i1si)hi(s-i).
Combining equations (2) and (3) we obtain: Es i e M i(S-si)hi(s-i) = W This must be true for all families of positive w'(s1). Hence R0 ++ is a subset of the image of ri. Because R i contains a basis for R'i, we conclude that ri must be of rank mi and the result is proved. have (s-ilsi) = Etl +sp(tj)T(s-i ti) with p(ti) > 0 for all ti E Mi\si. Then, for any lottery whose expected value is zero conditional on si, it cannot be true that for all ti * si the lottery has a negative expected value when conditioned on ti. 
We now choose w with the following properties: wi(s1) < w(s1) < w(t1) for all j#i, all sj E Mj and all ti E M1\sj. We will assume that a Bayesian auction { pi, X i e N exists which fully extracts the surplus for the problem { M, ,, w} and show that this leads to a contradiction. We would have, by Lemma 1: (4) Because w'(s1) is less than wi(t1) for all t., a
one s_ e M_ we have:
Multiplying both sides of (7) by pi(ti) and summing over all ti in Mi\si we obtain:
which contradicts Lemma 1, and the result is proved.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conditions of Theorems 1 and 2 will be met by "nearly all" information structures. In "nearly all" auctions, the seller should be able to extract the full surplus, which implies that asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers should be of no practical importance. Economic intuition and informal evidence (we know of no way to test such a proposition) suggest that this result is counterfactual, and several explanations can be suggested.
First, the assumption that a common knowledge probability distribution 7
exists is very strong. Though economic theorists have found this assumption convenient because it makes strategic problems with incomplete information analytically tractable, little discussion has been devoted to its ramifications for "real life" problems of mechanism design. Presumably, the seller in an auction would have to invest in costly research to determine iT prior to computing the optimal auction. This costly information gathering, not explicitly modeled in auction problems, may result in less profitable but vastly simpler auctions being used in practice. Furthermore the seller would have to be able to share the information that he has gathered with the buyers in a credible way, in order t ensure that iT is indeed common and this raises a host of difficult issues.
A second difficulty is linked to the fact that the penalties associated with lying (the gi(s-i) in the proof of Theorem 1) may have to be quite large. Introducing risk aversion in our analysis would modify the results in directions that will be a topic for future work, but note that the buyers in many auctions are firms for which the assumption of risk neutrality is appropriate. The same issue would arise if we introduced limited liability.
Finally, we should stress that in our opinion the independence assumption should be used only with great caution when deriving optimal auctions, at least in the case of finitely many types. It does enable the derivation of results that on the surface look more "realistic" (there is no full extraction of the surplus). However, the derivation of these results rely on a very "unrealistic" assumption. applies. When there are two bidders and ml and m2 are both equal to three, the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2 are equivalent. Hence, we consider an environment with two bidders such that ml = M2 = 4: the characteristics s1 and s2 can each take four possible values denoted respec (al,a2, a3,0a4) For instance, 7T(al, /3), the probab check that this information structure satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2, but not those of Theorem 1 because 12 times the first row plus 3 times the third is equal to 6 times the second plus 4 times the fourth.
A vector L = (yl, Y2, y3, y4) in R4 is interpreted as a lottery for, let us say, bidder 1 if we think of player 1 paying y, when bidder 2 announces /,. Consider the following four lotteries for player 1: L(al) = (-1000,100,100,100), L(a2) = (100, -2000,100,100), L(a3) = (100, -800, -400,100), and L(a4) = (-2000, 500, -2000,500) . If bidder 2 is truthful, then for i = 1. 4, the expected value of L(a,) to bidder 1, conditioned on the event that si = &,, is zero if a, is equal to &i and nega otherwise. Assume now that bidder 1 thinks that bidder 2 will tell the truth, and offer him the following choices. If he announces ai, he will get the object if wl(a,) is greater than w2(/3), where /3 the bid of player 2. He will have to pay wl(a,) times the probability that w2(f/) is smaller than wl(a, and be forced to participate in the lottery L(a,) multiplied by some constant. If the constant is large enough the expected surplus of the bidder will be zero if he announces the truth; and negative otherwise. The same construction can be made for bidder (-3000,500,500,-3000), L(/32) = (100,2000,200,100), L(/l3) = (-1000, 1000,-1000,0), L(/,4) = ( -3000, -2000, 500,500) . Hence, there exists a recipe for building a Bayesian-Nash auction which extracts the full surplus.
We now show that full extraction of the surplus by a dominant strategy auction cannot be guaranteed with this information structure. First, assume that the valuation functions satisfy the following condition: 0 < wI(al) < wI(a2) < w2(3, ) < w'(a3) < 3w (a3) < wI(a4).
Let { pi, xi } be a dominant strategy auction that extracts the full surplus. By Lemma 1, for all /,3, P1(Oa3, /,i) and P1(a4, /,i) are equal to 1, while p1(al, /,B) and P1(a2, /,B) are equal to 0. Substitution the incentive compatibility constraints shows that the following equations must hold for all /3: XI(al, /3) = XI(a2, /3), XI(a3, /3) = XI(a4, /3), WI(a2) -X1(a3, A/) < -xI(a2, /3), and WI X1 (a3, /3 ) ? -x1 (al, /i ). Using these equations, the values of pi derived above, and the fact th Lemma 1, the individual rationality constraints hold with equality we obtain: 20w'(a4) < 4w which contradicts the hypothesis that 3wl(a3) is less than wI(a4).
